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 In its brief history so far, the venture capital (VC) and private equity 
(PE) industry in East Africa has attracted a sizeable number of active 
participants, and investment activity is on the rise (EAVCA and KPMG 
 2015 ). Th is has been driven partly by the overall trend toward posi-
tive sentiments about the viability of Africa as a whole as an investment 
destination (Roxburgh et  al.  2010 ). Th e sustained positive economic 
growth of the continent over the past decade has generated some new-
found interest in the continent other than as a recipient for aid. Indeed, 
by some estimates, the total dollar value of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) (UNCTAD  2013 ; UNESCO  2013 ; Lautier and Moreaub  2012 ; 
M’Amanja and Morrissey  2006 ), infl ows to Africa now exceeds that of 
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offi  cial development assistance (ODA). Sy and Rakotondrazaka ( 2015 ) 
observed that there were only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
1990 that received greater FDI infl ows than ODA—Liberia and Nigeria. 
In 2012, 22 years later, 17 countries were receiving more FDI than ODA. 
 Early-stage venture funding through VC and PE fi nancing have been 
coming up as viable funding options for businesses alongside the traditional 
fi nancing avenues through commercial lenders (Deloitte  2015 ). According 
to an East Africa Venture Capital Association (EAVCA)–KPMG survey 
( 2015 ), 79 investment deals of this nature worth approximately USD800 
million were reported between 2007 and 2014 across East Africa (EAVCA 
 2014 ). An Intellicap ( 2015 ) report noted that VC funds have committed 
USD93 million since 2012 and that since 2010 PE investors have USD862 
million under management in Kenya alone (EAVCA and KMPG  2015 ). 
 What these statistics do not show is the fact that most general partners 
are in their fi rst-round funds and are not sure if they will be able to raise 
second-round funds. Th at said, we naturally expect that some learning will 
have taken place among the general partners in the course of investing in the 
region over the time period they have been operating. We set out to interview 
a number of VC and PE players in the industry with the objective of getting 
a sense of the current state of the industry and how its future might evolve. 
Right from the beginning, we found our respondents constantly alluding 
to the idea that in their experience some of the key attributes of the venture 
funding model commonly used—that of structuring a fund based on a part-
nership model between the general partners (GPs) who run the fund and the 
limited partners (LPs) who provide the investment capital (Tawiri  2010 ; Zider 
 1998 )—are not entirely suited to the East Africa context. Fund managers, 
for instance, thought the 7-to-12-year time span for a closed fund was not 
adequate and that the 2–3 % management fee was too low. 
 Th ese realizations led us to formulate our research question: Is there 
a right model for VC funding in East Africa? Further, it emerged in the 
course of our investigation that this question cannot be considered in 
isolation. Th e right model has to be considered in light of two key reali-
ties for VC investors in the region: constrained deal fl ow, which is a func-
tion of the nature of entrepreneurship in the region (e.g., the tendency 
for entrepreneurship in the region to be driven by necessity rather than 
opportunity), and a challenging exit environment. 
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 Literature Review 
 A 2010 report by McKinsey (Roxburgh et  al.  2010 ) showed Africa’s 
economy growing at an average pace of 4.9 % between 2000 and 2008. 
Th e East African Community (EAC) in particular—which comprises 
Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda—grew at an aver-
age pace of 6.2 % between 2004 and 2014 (Gigineishvili et al.  2014 ). 
Projections indicate that this growth is likely to be sustained in the short 
to medium term, because key economic indicators for the region, and 
the broader continent, are quite robust: a growing middle class and cor-
responding consumption patterns, rapid urbanization, stable (or stabiliz-
ing) governments, a large and growing proportion of youth who would 
provide labor, and so on. Eff orts to integrate the EAC countries economi-
cally under a common market while doing away with inhibitive trade and 
investment barriers could create a unifi ed market of more than 160 mil-
lion potential consumers (World Bank  2012 ). Perceptions about doing 
business in Africa have also changed considerably over time, becoming 
much more positive (EY  2015a ; Roxburgh et al.  2010 ). 
 It is in this general economic environment that PE and VC funding 
in East Africa have been developing. Buoyed by consistent growth and 
a favorable outlook, PE and VC in the region and the wider continent 
have developed progressively. Fundraising to invest specifi cally in Africa 
grew 24 % in 2014 over the previous year to USD4.1 billion (EY  2015b ). 
About USD1.6 billion was raised by the PE sector for the East Africa 
region between 2007 and 2014—7.3 % of a total USD22 billion targeted 
at Africa. Most funds were sized in the USD10 to USD50 million or 
USD100 to USD500 million range. Of the 79 deals worth approximately 
USD822 million reported within that time, 63  % were in Kenya and 
15 % were in Tanzania, including 27 % in agriculture, 14 % in fi nancial 
services, 11 % in fast-moving consumer goods, 10 % in information and 
communications technology (ICT), and 9 % in healthcare. Seventy of 
the 79 were below USD10 million in size. Th ere were 21 exits worth 
a combined value of USD260 million in the period, 43 % of them in 
fi nancial services. As in other frontier markets, the majority of funds were 
sourced from development fi nance institutions and high-net- worth indi-
viduals. Th e investors were mostly foreign, those from Europe accounting 
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for about 50 % of the total. Local investors from the East Africa region 
were only represented as a minority (EAVCA and KPMG  2015 ). 
 VC funding specifi cally in the technology sector in East Africa is an even 
more recent development and has to a large extent been focused on Kenya, 
which has gained prominence over the past seven years as a rising technology 
hub known as the Silicon Savannah. Total invested capital in tech start-ups 
across Africa more than doubled in 2015 to USD26.9 million from USD12 
million in 2014. Th e average capital secured per venture increased from 
USD129,348 to USD205,374 over the same period (VC4Africa  2015 ). 
 Earlier research (SAVCA-Monitor Group, SAVCA  2011 ) has shown that 
the cost of running a fund in Africa is generally quite high compared with 
that of other markets, a fact that has not been refl ected in compensation 
structures, which have more or less been borrowed “as is” from other experi-
ences of investing in developed markets. Th ere is a shortage of skilled talent 
for funds. Th e operating environment is also characterized by high competi-
tion for viable investments and a shortage of deal fl ow. GPs mostly have to 
deal with founder-led fi rms that need signifi cant business support from the 
investor to help them develop their governance, management, and opera-
tional capabilities to a level comparable to those that an investment-ready 
fi rm in the West would be adding to its cost base for funds and eating into 
its investment window. Furthermore, the deal intermediary and service pro-
vider ecosystem are relatively underdeveloped, meaning that GPs have had 
to do almost all the work, from sourcing deals to preparing them for exit. 
 Methods 
 In addition to secondary sources (i.e., industry reports and news articles) 
and the experiences of both authors in East Africa’s investment landscape, 
primary data were collected from interviews with representatives of six 
investment funds (see Table  14.1 below). Th e six were selected for the fact 
that they were involved in investments across the region and in invest-
ment prematurity stage ventures. It should be noted that the six were 
selected purely for these reasons and for their availability to participate. 
We cannot claim that they constituted a scientifi c sample of the popula-
tion of VC investors in the region. Data were collected by means of ques-
tionnaires administered through face-to-face interviews.
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 We investigated the following aspects: fund structure and remunera-
tion, team and roles, fundraising, deal sourcing and due diligence, invest-
ing, post-investment, and exit. Some of the investors invested as little 
as less than a hundred thousand dollars to start-up ventures, and others 
invested in the millions. In terms of their portfolios, several had invest-
ments across early-stage ventures through mature fi rms, where others 
were specialized. Moreover, our respondents invested in multiple coun-
tries and various sectors, including technology, healthcare, manufactur-
ing, and fi nancial services. Th e majority of the fi rms we spoke with are in 
the investment and early holding period of their funds. 
 Results 
 Four out of our six respondents stated that their funds were organized in 
the classic partnership structure. Two were organized as companies; one, 
a limited liability; and the other, limited by guarantee. Th e two limited 
companies were more focused on early-stage investing at the seed–start-
 up stages. All of the investment funds were incorporated outside East 
Africa, mostly in European countries. One of the companies was reg-
istered as a holding company in Europe with two separate entities in 
Kenya—a company limited by guarantee and a limited company. Th is 
was because the fi rm carried out both for-profi t and not-for-profi t activi-
ties. Th e other company was based in the Seychelles, “where it is easy to 
operate due to very low capital gains taxes and relative ease of set up,” as 
one our respondents noted. Most of the respondents cited tax benefi ts 
as the main consideration in deciding where to incorporate. One fund 
incorporated in the Netherlands noted that the country has favorable 
legislation for funds; it is tax-transparent, meaning that individual inves-
tors are taxed instead of the fund. 
 Cost repeatedly came up as a major concern for industry players. Th is 
led to our asking about the remuneration of GPs. We found that the 
partnership-based funds, as expected, took the more or less standard 
2–3 % management fee. However, all our respondents noted that operat-
ing expenses in East Africa have tended to be higher than average. One 
respondent went as far as suggesting that management fees should be in 
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the 5–6 % range. In addition, the partnership-based funds followed the 
standard ten-year (maximum) lifecycle from starting the fund to winding 
it down. Our respondents felt that fi nding suitable investments in this 
region took much more time and eff ort than average, calling the standard 
ten-year life of a fund into question. One of our respondents noted, for 
instance, that on average, it takes a year from identifying an opportunity 
to invest in and closing the deal. Another noted that the longest it had 
taken them from initiation to close was three years for one of their deals, 
explaining that “in the best case scenario, it takes us three to four months 
from identifying the opportunity to concluding an investment. In the 
worst case scenario it can be up to three years.” 
 Th e respondents noted that, when it came to fundraising, the vast 
majority of investment funds in the industry were foreign—typically devel-
opment fi nance institutions, as is the case in most frontier markets. Th e 
dearth of local capital, even from local pension funds, was a major concern. 
Koome and Kipanga ( 2013 ) note that at the time of their research, no local 
pension had invested in PE. However, more recently the PE fi rm Ascent 
Capital of Bangalore, India, managed to draw Kenya Power Pension Fund 
and Nation Media Group Pension Fund into their Sh8 billion fundrais-
ing (Gachiri  2015 ). It was noted that high-net-worth individuals in the 
region were mostly unfamiliar with the asset class and were more comfort-
able with traditional investments—real estate, shares, and bonds—that 
are perceived as being less risky. New legislation in Kenya (specifi cally 
the Retirement Benefi ts Authority [RBA] Act and the Insurance Act that 
govern the pension-fund and insurance industries), for instance, allows 
pension funds to allocate funds to alternative assets, although there is still 
low uptake among pension funds (FSD Kenya  2008 ). 
 Generally speaking, our respondents felt that the standard partnership- 
based fund structure was not well adapted to the regional context and 
boxed them in. However, we also noted that LPs are accustomed to this 
structure and that GPs have little chance of altering it. One respondent 
proposed that his fi rm would consider using an investment vehicle, such 
as a holding company, in the future instead of using the partnership fund 
structure. Th is would solve the problem of investment horizons and partly 
solve the exit issues, because the funds would exit only when good avenues 
arose instead of exiting in accordance with preset time limits. Additionally, 
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it would remove the need for explicitly set management fees based on the 
amount of funds raised, thereby also addressing the cost issue. 
 All our respondents reported that they maintained the smallest teams 
they could manage with (usually fewer than 10 members) in order to 
minimize operating costs. Th ey tended to hire skilled individuals who 
had extensive work experience that could encompass multiple role expec-
tations. One respondent said, “We have two people who are dedicated 
to sourcing deals. Th e same two need to be technical enough to sell the 
proposition,” referring to the fact that even the staff ers doing work that 
ordinarily did not need technical skills still needed these skills in order to 
take on the additional tasks. As another noted, “Everyone on our team is 
involved in sourcing deals.” In addition to the typical functions covered in 
a fund (sourcing, selection, due diligence, valuation, and negotiation), we 
found two peculiar characteristics among our respondents: First, because 
of cost constraints, the funds (instead of the portfolio companies) had to 
do a large part of the work themselves to get a deal to its fi nancial close 
internally. For instance, one of our respondents indicated that his fi rm 
handled all aspects of due diligence internally. Second, the funds tended 
to be highly involved in the operations of their portfolio companies. Th e 
reason given for this was that the GPs typically had to deal with founder- 
led fi rms that needed signifi cant business support from the investor to 
help them develop their governance, reporting, management, and opera-
tional capabilities. Funds used a mix of in-house resources and exter-
nal consultants to support their portfolio companies. One respondent 
said, “We sent experienced consultants to the diff erent companies to help 
operationally. We also did a lot on the board.” In addition, to minimize 
costs, the funds preferred to have regional offi  ces in one location rather 
than multiple offi  ces. “Having satellite offi  ces is hard. Teams tend to be 
small,” said one respondent. Another said, “You operate where you know 
best.” Th is ends up aff ect deal sourcing, as we shall see. 
 When it came to deal sourcing, the underlying theme across the spec-
trum was the highly relationship-based nature of the industry. As one 
fund manager said, “Right from deal sourcing, it’s a very network- sourced 
industry.” Th e funds relied heavily on social networks to source their deals 
and tended not to turn to intermediaries, such as investment advisory 
fi rms. “We don’t use intermediaries to source our deals. Most of them place 
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their own interests above those of the fund. Th ey rarely give us what we are 
looking for,” one respondent remarked. Another respondent noted that 
the quality of intermediaries was not as high as in more mature markets. 
In addition, the respondent felt that many times, deals that came through 
intermediaries had been “shopped around,” that is, had already been pre-
sented to multiple investors in the same form. Th e clear preference among 
our respondents was to build strong personal networks by building trust 
(e.g., through information exchange, pro-bono work, membership in key 
associations, personal attendance of domestic conferences, and recipro-
cal action) and a good reputation (depending on multiple factors, such 
as the performance of investees, condition of investor–investee relation-
ships, degree of embeddedness in the business community, and long-term 
interest in the region) such that deals could confi dently be referred to the 
respondent. Th is kind of “social capital,” however, takes signifi cant time 
and patience to develop and can make things harder for new funds mak-
ing their initial foray into a region. Some funds used the media to attract 
deals. One noted that one of their best marketing tools was contributing 
articles to newspapers or publicizing their investments, which would lead 
to potential investees contacting them. 
 On average, the funds ended up investing in only about one out of every 
hundred deal opportunities. Th e issue of time in getting deals to fi nancial 
close was often raised. One respondent noted, “It takes long to build the 
fi rst deal. You need time to network so that you can move; the fi rst deal is a 
big thing in this case. People need to know if you are serious.” Th e respon-
dent proceeded to explain that although it is in the investor’s interest to put 
in the work in order to help increase the value of the company ahead of 
the exit, entrepreneurs looked at this diff erently. Th e majority knew they 
needed help to build up their businesses and took this positively, but others 
perceived it as the investors meddling. As such, the respondent noted that 
the buy-in of the entrepreneur is critical from the start. 
 As for investment instruments, we found that investors used instru-
ments similar to those used in developed markets—with several altera-
tions. One of the accelerators we spoke with, for instance, off ered 
training, coaching, business development, and support services to a 
cohort of ventures but did not take a stake upfront. Instead, at the end of 
the accelerator period, the investors selected the most promising ventures 
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and converted the value of their support to a predetermined shareholding 
if the investee company was able to raise funds in a specifi ed amount of 
time. Another interesting model we found was revenue-based fi nancing, 
in which the investor took a royalty on sales as part of the return toward 
debt repayment until the debt and interest were paid off . Structures such 
as these ensure that in case the investment does not perform as expected, 
the funds can protect their downside risk to some extent. 
 As for deal fl ow, our respondents cited the exit as the most challenging 
aspect of investing in East Africa. Although trade sales and sales to strategic 
buyers were the most promising exit avenues in the market, it was pointed 
out that there were not many big fi rms locally that were in the market for 
acquisitions. Illiquid public markets have further added to the exit chal-
lenge, in the sense that without a fi nal exit through public markets, the 
chain has no termination point for larger investors to harvest value—which 
creates a scarcity of buyers for VC projects (see Fig.  14.1 below).
 Discussion 
 Venture funding in developed markets, particularly in the West, has sev-
eral decades of history behind it (Gordon  2012 ; Hsu and Kenney  2004 ). 
VC and PE activity in East Africa, by contrast, is a very recent import 
and is still in its formative stages. Th e Western model has been refi ned, 
as it were, over the years and decades through the experiences of practi-
tioners and other stakeholders, such as policy makers, to suit the context 
and characteristics of venturing in that context (Ferrary and Granovetter 
 2009 ). Further, the model has seen widespread uptake and been exported 











 Fig. 14.1  Challenges in the current exit environment in East Africa 
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is not guaranteed to succeed, given the new contexts’ potentially unique 
dynamics, especially in terms of the nature of local entrepreneurship, 1 as 
we shall see shortly in the case of East Africa. Indeed as our respondents 
noted, there are substantial diffi  culties with the application of the Western 
partnership-based fund model in its strict form in the East African con-
text. Compensation structure (Gompers and Lerner  1999 ; Litvak  2009 ) 
and fund life were particularly called into question. 
 We found that a lack of signifi cant amounts of local participation in 
venture funding has been a major constraint for the industry. Probable 
local investors tend to prioritize for security and to be averse to risk and the 
unknown. Yet they have a much better grasp of local dynamics and could 
be of great value both on the investor side and the entrepreneur side. On 
the investor side, local investors can bring local know-how and understand-
ing of the local norms and nuances of doing business as well as the long-
term view needed for VC and private capital. Furthermore, they can add to 
the perception of the fund’s local credibility, enhancing trust among local 
entrepreneurs. On the entrepreneur side, local investors, particularly those 
who have been successful in business in the past, can bring local market 
knowledge, contacts, and business linkages (Mäkelä and Maula  2008 ). Th is 
kind of support is especially critical for inexperienced early-stage founders 
and would be hard for a purely foreign player to match. 
 In contrast to US pension funds, East Africa’s pension funds scarcely 
invest in VC.  But it appears that commercial banks may be starting 
to dabble in it (Black and Gilson  1999 ). In the recent past, we have 
seen some commercial banks in Kenya getting involved in the tech 
start-up arena through partnerships (e.g., Chase Bank with the Nairobi 
Innovation Hub [iHub] [Jackson  2015a ; Chase Bank  2015 ] and Barclays 
Bank, which has run an accelerator for fi nancial technology start-ups 
in collaboration with a VC investor [Jackson  2015b ]). We see this as 
potentially pointing to possible involvement in VC at some point, and 
we foresee that pensions will remain skeptical about VC in the short to 
medium term. Positive returns from the earlier-mentioned investment 
by two pension funds in Ascent Capital could, however, stimulate more 
interest by pension funds. 
1  See Bruton et al. ( 2004 ) for a similar study in East Asia. 
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 Cost and ease of doing business in East Africa have clearly been impedi-
ments to VC funding. Th ese factors vary quite signifi cantly across the indi-
vidual countries in the region. According to the 2015 World Bank Doing 
Business Ranking (World Bank  2015 ), Rwanda, Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania ranked 62nd, 108th, 122nd, and 139th globally, respectively, in 
cost and ease of doing business. In terms of enforcing contracts, Tanzania 
ranked 64th, Uganda ranked 78th, Kenya ranked 102nd, and Rwanda 
ranked 127th. For investors hungry for deal fl ow and scouring the region 
to fi nd deals, this situation can be daunting. Corruption presents itself as 
another major stumbling block, adding to the cost and complexity of doing 
business (Smarzynska and Wei  2000 ). Moreover, the East African bloc 
is a combination of fi ve countries with diff erent norms, legislation, and 
entrepreneurial cultures (Autio et al.  2013 ). Th is means that VC and PE 
focusing on fi rms in the region need to open local satellite offi  ces or incur 
signifi cant travel costs that further increase the costs of doing business. 
 Th e region’s rather lengthy lag times between identifying and making 
an investment can be partly explained by a lack of trust and understand-
ing of VC and PE on the part of entrepreneurs. In a market where inves-
tors—mostly foreign capital—are seeking local entrepreneurs, investors 
need to take time to “court” entrepreneurs and convince them to accept 
capital, not least because business owners in the region are more familiar 
with and accustomed to fi nancing their work through commercial loans 
instead of VC.  In addition, we have seen that a number of businesses 
that investors get involved in tend to need a lot of work to bring them 
up to standard in terms of eff ective operations and governance. Th e need 
for business support is a crosscutting feature of businesses in East Africa 
(Omidyar  2013 ), not just those that receive VC. However, with a lack of 
alternatives to provide such support, investors are placed in a situation 
where they have to take over this role in order to help develop the venture 
for future exit. Th is creates additional demands on the fund manager’s 
time that could otherwise have been spent on other aspects of running 
the fund. It also requires a more active engagement by the fund manager 
in potential investees and a broader knowledge base to go beyond purely 
administering an investment fund. When the fund manager opts to bring 
in professional consultants, even more additional costs are incurred, fur-
ther straining management fees. 
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 Th e need for heavy post-investment involvement means fund manag-
ers getting in the market have to be prepared to play roles that go well 
above and beyond the call of duty for their typical role. Th ey have to 
take on tasks related to coaching, mentoring, and training—becoming, 
in other words, enmeshed in the operational activities of their portfo-
lio companies and signifi cantly blurring the lines between investor and 
investee. Th is has an impact in turn on the composition of the fund’s 
team. Compared with typical fund teams in mature markets, funds oper-
ating locally require people with operational business skills and immense 
contextual market knowledge; the alternative is to hire consultants. 
However, involvement in investee operations can create the potential for 
confl icts with entrepreneurs who are only interested in the fund’s money, 
wishing to run their businesses as they see fi t and to avoid the percep-
tion, especially among start-ups, that equity investors will take away their 
control in the fi rm—with the result that they become skeptical of VC. 2 
 In our opinion, the lack of an exit avenue to public markets will 
remain the case in the short to medium term. According to data com-
piled by PricewaterhouseCoopers ( 2014 ), Kenya’s stock market, the 
largest by market capitalization in the East Africa region, had only fi ve 
initial public off erings from 2010 to 2014, raising a total of USD157 
million; Tanzania had four, raising USD16 million; and Rwanda and 
Uganda each had only two raising, USD91 million and USD69 million, 
 respectively. Some exchanges, such as the Nairobi Securities Exchange, 
have introduced market segments targeted at small and medium enter-
prises with lower and less stringent listing thresholds, but these have yet 
to really kick off  and become vibrant enough as exit avenues. Liquid 
stock markets will draw in larger investors that will create demand from 
earlier VC (Black and Gilson  1999 ). As more multinationals seek entry 
into markets across Africa, investors that position themselves strategically 
through their holdings could fi nd potential buyers (see Fig.  14.2 below).
 On the other hand, VC is driven by the supply of high-quality entre-
preneurship, creating a steady pipeline of deals for venture funders. Th e 
2  See De Clercq et al.  2006 for a fascinating overview of the VC’s world through the lens of the 
entrepreneur, and Collewaert and Fassin  2013 on the possible confl icts in investor–investee 
relations. 
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region is not lacking or behind the curve in entrepreneurial dynamism, 
as evidenced by Kenya’s noted “hustling” culture, in which one can often 
have a full-time job and one or more other income-generating activities 
(usually not formally organized businesses) that are pursued on a deal-
by- deal basis (Simons  2012 ). Much of the entrepreneurship that exists in 
the region (as in much of the rest of Africa) for those in “full-time” entre-
preneurship, is characterized as necessity entrepreneurship (Giacomin et 
al.  2011 ), that is, as a means of survival and a way of earning an income, 
having failed to secure other means of making a living or supplementing 
one’s income—as distinct from conventional entrepreneurship driven by 
the identifi cation of an opportunity (Omidyar  2013 ). Muller and Amit 
( 1995 ) referred to “push” versus “pull” entrepreneurship: Push entrepre-
neurs start ventures out of some kind of dissatisfaction with their current 
state, not as a result of their entrepreneurial spirit. Pull entrepreneurs are 
motivated by the attractiveness of the new venture in and of itself. Muller 
and Amit concluded that pull entrepreneurs are more successful than push 
entrepreneurs. Th e latter, thus, do not create opportunities as valuable for 
VC as intentional, opportunity-driven pull entrepreneurship does. 
 Th e problem of entrepreneurship supply is really about developing a 
culture of entrepreneurship, specifi cally the propensity for risk taking 
and a tolerance for failure. Nothing short of more and better-quality 
entrepreneurship will provide a lasting solution to the challenge of 
deal fl ow. Th is new kind of culture cannot emerge instantaneously. 
Cultures develop over time, and once entrenched are diffi  cult to alter. 
Th e fact that entrepreneurship as a career seems to have gained general 
acceptance (Omidyar  2013 ) is encouraging. However, the hallmarks of 
entrepreneurship culture—again, the propensity for risk taking and a 
tolerance for failure—have yet to emerge suffi  ciently across the board. 
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 Fig. 14.2  A functioning exit environment 
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investors as they have to expend less time and money to fi nd suitable 
investees. Better entrepreneurship will also mean that investors will 
not need to be so highly involved in their investees’ businesses, cutting 
costs further. 
 In a bid to bridge access to fi nance, governments in the region have taken 
initiative to create funds—usually subsidized loan funds such as Rwanda’s 
Hanga Umurimo (meaning “create your own job”) Fund, the Uwezo 
(meaning “enable”) Fund in Kenya, and the National Entrepreneurship 
Development Fund in Tanzania—to support entrepreneurs. However, we 
feel that their eff orts would better be directed at initiatives that provide 
entrepreneurs business support, emphasizing practical entrepreneurship 
skills in curricula and adapting education systems to develop entrepre-
neurialism in students from an early age. In fact, some have already ques-
tioned the possible role of such subsidy programs in eroding—rather than 
promoting—the entrepreneurial edge of benefi ciaries. 3 
 Th us, we fi nd VC in East Africa in a dilemma: on the one hand, a lim-
ited supply of high-value deals and, on the other hand, a challenging exit 
environment. Compounding this dilemma are the issues of time, cost, 
and lack of local capital providers for VC investing. Figure  14.3 summa-
rizes these challenges for VC in East Africa.
 Recommendations 
 While the general idea of a partnership-based fund may still hold in 
East Africa, the specifi c characteristics of the partnership—the man-
agement fee percentage, carried interest, fund life, team composition, 
investment instruments, and so on—do not necessarily apply in the 
same way across diff erent contexts. Nevertheless, this is the fund struc-
ture that foreign LPs, which constitute the main source of investment 
funds in the region, are familiar and comfortable with. Altering the 
modalities of the structure signifi cantly might be desirable but is not 
feasible in the immediate term. 
3  See  http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2014-09-18/181038/ for an intriguing recent 
article on whether government gives too much to start-ups. 
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 As such, we recommend that fund managers  adopt a lean ,  start-up – like 
mentality of frugality and maximize resources as best as they can to oper-
ate eff ectively in the region. Joint ventures between funds investing in the 
same sectors can increase their geographic coverage, split the burden in 
terms of cost and eff ort to fi nd and make investments, and potentially 
help them get into bigger deals. Th is can be a good strategy for investors 
coming into the market for the fi rst time, because it can help reduce the 
time it takes to close their fi rst deal. 
 Fund managers should also  consider alternative structures : evergreen 
funds where the fund has an indefi nite fund life and a periodic inbuilt 
liquidity event to cater to LPs who would like to exit and to management, 
to calculate carried interest. Evergreen funds also have the advantage of 
keeping the gems in the portfolio within the fund while doing away with 
layered management fees that can be quite costly for the LP.  Another 
structure that could be pursued to address the time issue is the setting 
up of investment holding companies in which capital providers can buy 
shares. As indicated earlier, there would be no management fees or exit 
stipulations. Fund managers would be remunerated as the company’s 
agents, and the holding company would hold investments as long as it 
deems necessary and exit at the opportune time. 
Challenges of Venture Capital in East Africa
Cost & time constraints limiting
returns
Lack of local capital providers











 Fig. 14.3  The dilemma of venture capital in East Africa 
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 In terms of encouraging local capital, we see great potential in  bring-
ing corporations into VC either as suppliers of capital to funds or through 
in-house managed funds. As it stands, established fi rms in East Africa are 
not known to be very active in corporate venturing. Safaricom Limited in 
Kenya has been a pioneer in this direction, having set up its Safaricom Spark 
Fund that focuses on investments in tech start-ups. 4 We envision that estab-
lished corporations investing in and working with young enterprises could 
bring in the rigor of administering an established enterprise. Furthermore, 
the enterprises could gain competitive advantage from being exposed to 
the corporation’s internal resources and market. For the corporation itself, 
the innovation associated with start-ups could result in new product lines. 
Second, local savings and investment groups, known as chamas, could be 
another source of capital. 5 Some chamas command sizeable funds that could 
be directed to VC activity. Th e challenge with the majority of chamas is 
their lack of investment sophistication; most stick to the well-understood 
areas of real estate and stocks, security being more attractive to them than 
high returns. Th e long-term horizon of VC investments does not sit well 
with chamas either. Th at said,  structuring funds as investment holding com-
panies, as suggested earlier, could be attractive to chamas, because the idea 
of buying shares in a holding company is familiar, and in fact some larger 
chamas attract members by issuing shares in the group. 
 We see also two additional interesting avenues that could be explored 
to improve the entrepreneurship supply:  introduce venture builders and 
search funds . Venture builders are outfi ts that create start-ups internally 
using shared resources, develop them, and then spin them off  (as distinct 
from accelerators, which solicit external entrepreneurs and ventures). We 
are familiar with at least one venture builder—Brave Ventures—that is 
in its formative stages in Kenya. 6 Search funds, by contrast, have inves-
tors in the fund fi nancially supporting an entrepreneur’s eff orts to locate, 
acquire, manage, and grow an existing privately held company. To our 
knowledge, there is only one active search fund in the region (Kolarova 
et al.  2014 ). However, these two avenues cannot really create new entre-
4  See  http://www.safaricom.co.ke/spark/ and  http://disrupt-africa.com/2015/11/sendy-named-1st-
safaricom-spark-venture-fund-investee/ 
5  For a comprehensive review, see KAIG ( 2014 ). 
6  See  https://braveventurelabs.com/ for more details. 
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preneurs at scale. Only a thriving opportunity-driven entrepreneurship 
culture will produce the kind of deal fl ow investors are looking for. 
 On the matter of exits: Funds could explore  weaving in self-liquidating 
securities . A fund could, for instance, invest in a mix of high-interest- 
yielding loans and equity. Th is would ensure that the equity portion 
does not need to exit at signifi cant levels for the target returns to be met 
(hence increasing the likelihood of exit) while at the same time, return-
ing some cash to the investors before the fi nal exit event. Gilson and 
Black (1999) suggested that a solution for the lack of active local stock 
markets for VC to exit to, while avoiding the time and eff ort needed to 
develop local markets, would be to turn to external markets in the way 
Israeli ventures have found an avenue through US capital markets. In 
the same manner, creating avenues for East Africa’s ventures to  list on 
more mature stock markets on the continent —such as the Johannesburg 
AltX—could be worth exploring. 
 In terms of future research, we feel that the cultural eff ects of invest-
ing in East Africa need further investigation. In particular, the Kenyan 
hustling culture described earlier has been a stumbling block to foreign 
investors, who feel that entrepreneurs should be ready and willing to drop 
everything else in order to focus 100 % on their venture—an obstacle 
that has also turned many entrepreneurs away from seeking investment, 
knowing that this would be required of them. (See Eskor John’s chapter 
in this book on portfolio entrepreneurship.) Th e issue is further com-
pounded by the fact that foreigners are quite active and getting more 
so over time in Kenya’s start-up scene. Th is is inevitable in a globalized 
world. Foreigners come with a knack born out of experience for iden-
tifying and seizing opportunities and, through established networks, 
 gathering the resources to launch and grow ventures—easily bypassing 
locals. If some of the stumbling blocks to the development of a vibrant 
start-up ecosystem are cultural in nature and changing culture takes time, 
how will local founders stack up against their counterparts who are com-
ing in with the skills and experience? 
 Another area that could be investigated further is the intermediaries’ 
space—that is, which aspects of VC are most in need of intermediation 
and how can this be developed? A strong intermediary network would, 
for instance, shorten the amount of time, eff ort, and associated cost 
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required by investors to source for deals. Yet another aspect that could 
be interesting to research further would be to benchmark the risk profi le 
for investing in East Africa against that of other markets and those of the 
individual countries. Is it generally more risky to invest in Tanzania or 
in Uganda, for instance? And if so, why? And how can the risk be mini-
mized? Th is can help investors better focus their eff orts and help govern-
ments make better interventions to promote entrepreneurship and VC. 
 Conclusion 
 To summarize: We found that the high cost of operating a fund in the 
region and the length of time it takes to make an investment are the top-
most concerns among fund managers. Further, fund managers are called 
upon to take on roles, such as acting as a mentor and business coach to 
investees, that are not typical of fund management. Fund managers have to 
expend their own time or that of their staff  to support investees or spend 
money to hire consultants to do so. Th e dearth of local investors in VC 
stood out, and we noted that the industry would be better off  with more of 
this. In addition, the surrounding issues of deal fl ow and exit were identi-
fi ed as being pertinent. Th ese may not be exactly in the realm of the “right 
model” in terms of fund structures, but they inevitably have an impact on 
what structure works best. We also found that the industry is heavily depen-
dent on social networks rather than intermediaries to source investments. 
 We conclude that the key aspects needed to increase the chances of 
success for existing funds and new classical partnership-styled funds 
making their initial foray into the region are the following:  Fund 
managers need to adopt a lean, start-up—like approach to fund 
management and investing, gain a keen understanding of and take 
into consideration the nature of entrepreneurship in the region, and 
be ready to take on a far more active role in the business than fund 
manager typically do—while maintaining amicable relations with the 
founders and owners. Further, we recommend that fund managers 
explore new structures to circumvent cost and time constraints, such 
as investment holding companies and evergreen funds. To tackle the 
issues of deal fl ow, we propose that governments in the region should 
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focus on entrepreneurship education and business, instead of on pro-
viding subsidized loans. We drew attention to venture builders and 
search funds as having potential to create investment-worthy ventures. 
As to successful exits, we proposed opening up avenues to more liq-
uid markets by way of external markets, much as Israeli ventures have 
found an avenue through US capital markets, as a way of circumvent-
ing illiquid regional markets. 
 In the end, then,  is there a right model for venture funding in East Africa ? 
Not yet. But we believe that it will emerge in the years ahead—as VCs 
continue to learn to adapt to the context and take into account the unique 
characteristics of venturing in the region. 
 References 
 Amit, R., & Muller, E. (1995). Push and pull entrepreneurship.  Journal of Small 
Business & Entrepreneurship, 12 (4), 64–80. 
 Autio, E., Pathak, S., & Wennberg, K. (2013). Consequences of cultural prac-
tices for entrepreneurial behaviors.  Journal of International Business Studies, 
44 (4), 334–362. 
 Black, B. S., & Gilson, R. J. (1999). Does venture capital require an active stock 
market?  Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 11 (4), 36–48. 
 Bruton, G., Ahlstrom, D., & Yeh, K. S. (2004). Understanding venture capital 
in East Asia: Th e impact of institutions on the industry today and tomorrow. 
 Journal of World Business, 39 (1), 72–88. 
 Chase Bank Kenya. (2015). Chase Bank and iHub sign partnership towards 
excellence in product innovation/excellence.  Chase Bank Kenya .  https://www.
chasebankkenya.co.ke/news-update/chase-bank-and-ihub-sign-partnership-
towards-excellence-product-innovationexcellence . Accessed 6 Dec 2015. 
 Collewaert, V., & Fassin, Y. (2013). Confl icts between entrepreneurs and inves-
tors: Th e impact of perceived unethical behavior.  Small Business Economics, 
40 (3), 635–649. 
 De Clercq, D., Fried, V. H., Lehtonen, O., & Sapienza, H. J. (2006). An entre-
preneur’s guide to the venture capital galaxy.  Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 20 (3), 90–112. 
 Deloitte (2015).  Africa private equity conﬁ dence survey: 2015 . Johannesburg: 
Deloitte nancing avenues though commercial lenders. 
448 S. Gugu and W. Mworia
 EY. (2015a).  EY  ’ s attractiveness Survey Africa 2015 :  Making choices . EYGM. 
 EY. (2015b).  Private equity roundup :  Africa . EYGM. 
 EAVCA and KPMG (2015).  Private equity industry survey of East Africa for the 
period 2007 to 2014 . Nairobi: KPMG. 
 Ferrary, M., & Granovetter, M. (2009). Th e role of venture capital fi rms in 
Silicon Valley’s complex innovation network.  Economy and Society, 18 (May), 
326–359. 
 FSD Kenya (2008).  SME risk capital funds: Constraints to Kenyan institutional 
investors . Nairobi: FSD Kenya. 
 Gachiri, J. (2015). PE fi rm Ascent raises Sh8bn for new fund.  Business Daily . 
 http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/PE-fi rm-Ascent-raises-Sh8bn-for-new- 
fund/-/539552/2903264/-/hs5xmz/-/index.html . Accessed June 15 2015. 
 Giacomin, O., Janssen, F., Guyot, J. L., & Lohest, O. (2011). Opportunity and/
or necessity entrepreneurship? Th e impact of the socio-economic characteris-
tics of entrepreneurs.  MPRA Paper, 29506 , 1–42. 
 Gigineishvili, N., Mauro, P., & Wang, K. (2014). How solid is economic growth 
in the East African Community?  International Monetary Fund (Working 
Paper No. 14/150). 
 Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (1999). An analysis of compensation in the U.S. ven-
ture capital partnership.  Journal of Financial Economics, 51 (1), 13–44. 
 Gordon, J. S. (2012). A short (sometimes profi table) history of private equity. 
 Th e Wall Street Journal .  http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405297020
4468004577166850222785654 . Accessed 15 June 2015. 
 Hsu, D. H., & Kenney, M. (2004). Organizing venture capital: the rise and 
demise of American Research and Development Corporation.  Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 14 , 579–616. 
 Intellicap Business Consulting Team. (2015).  Closing the gap :  Updates on key 
challenges for the missing middle in Kenya .  Intellicap .  http://english.dggf.nl/
fi le/download/40238782 . Accessed 17 Nov 2015. 
 Jackson, T. (2015a). Barclays Kenya partners Moringa School, Nest to launch 
Product Lab.  Disrupt Africa .  http://disrupt-africa.com/2015/09/barclays-kenya- 
partners-moringa-school-nest-to-launch-product-lab/ . Accessed 6 Dec 2015. 
 Jackson, T. (2015b). Kenyan fi ntech startups invited to apply for Chase Bank, 
iHub support.  Disrupt Africa .  http://disrupt-africa.com/2015/08/kenyan-
fi ntech- startups-invited-to-apply-for-chase-bank-ihub-support/ . Accessed 6 
Dec 2015. 
 Kenya Association of Investment Groups (KAIG) (2014).  Th e Chama Handbook 
2014 (2nd ed.). Nairobi: KAIG. 
14 Venture Capital in East Africa: Is There a Right Model? 449
 Kolarova, L., Kelly P., Davila, A., & Johnson, R. (2014). International Search 
Funds 2013 – Selected Observations.  IESE Business School . 
 Koome, K., & Kipanga, B. (2013).  A case for private equity investments by pension 
funds in Kenya . Nairobi: Retirement Benefi ts Authority. 
 Lautier, M., & Moreaub, F. (2012). Domestic investment and FDI in develop-
ing countries: Th e missing link.  Journal of Economic Development, 37 (3), 1. 
 Litvak, K. (2009). Venture capital limited partnership agreements: Understanding 
compensation arrangements.  Th e University of Chicago Law Review, 2009 , 
161–218. 
 M’Amanja, D., & Morrissey, O. (2006).  Foreign aid, investment, and economic 
growth in Kenya: A time series approach (CREDIT research paper, no. 06/05). 
 Mäkelä, M. M., & Maula, M. V. (2008). Attracting cross-border venture capi-
tal: Th e role of a local investor.  Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 
20 (3), 237–257. 
 Monitor Group and SAVCA. (2011). Private equity in the shadow of giants: 
Innovative approaches along the investment value chain in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Silk Invest .  http://www.silkinvest.com/2011/12/african-private- 
equity-report-in-the-shadow-of-giants.html . Accessed 23 Feb 2016. 
 Ndikumana, L., & Verick, S. (2008). Th e linkages between FDI and domestic 
investment: Unravelling the developmental impact of foreign investment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.  Development Policy Review, 26 (6), 713–726. 
 Omidyar Network and Monitor Group. (2013). Accelerating Entrepreneurship 
in Africa.  Omidyar Network .  https://www.omidyar.com/insights/accelerating-
entrepreneurship- africa-report . Accessed 23 Feb 2016. 
 PricewaterhouseCoopers (2014). Africa IPO Watch 2014.  http://www.pwc.co.
za/en/publications/ipo-watch.html . Accessed 9 Sept 2015. 
 Roxburgh, Charles, et al. “Lions on the move: Th e progress and potential of 
African economies.” McKinsey Global Institute (2010). 
 Simons B. (2012). What Africa’s entrepreneurs can teach the world.  Harvard 
Business Review .  https://hbr.org/2012/03/what-africas-entrepreneurs-can/ . 
Accessed 15 June 2015. 
 Smarzynska, B. K., & Wei, S. (2000). Corruption and composition of foreign 
direct investment: Firm-level evidence.  National Bureau of Economic Research 
(Working paper 7969). 
 Sy, A., & Rakotondrazaka, F.  M. (2015). Private capital fl ows, offi  cial develop-
ment assistance, and remittances to Africa: Who gets what? Washington, DC: 
Brookings.  http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Papers/2015/05/
official-development-assistance-africa-sy-rakotondrazaka/Private-Capital-
Flowswebv3.pdf?la=en . Accessed 15 June 2015. 
450 S. Gugu and W. Mworia
 Tawiri, N. (2010). Domestic investment as a drive of economic growth in Libya. 
 International conference on applied economics-ICOAE , pp. 759–767. 
 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTD) (2013). 
 Strengthening linkages between domestic and foreign direct investment in Africa . 
Geneva: UNCTD. 
 United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESC) (2013).  Public aid as a 
driver of private investment . New York: UNESC. 
 VC4Africa. (2015). Venture Finance in Africa: ‘Th e progress of early-stage high- 
potential growth companies’.  VC4Africa. 
 World Bank (2012).  East African community reshaping economic geography of East 
Africa: From regional to global integration . World Bank: Washington, DC. 
 World Bank (2015).  Doing business 2015: Going beyond eﬃ  ciency . World Bank: 
Washington, DC. 
 Zider, B. (1998). How venture capital works.  Havard Business Review, 26 (6), 
131–139. 
14 Venture Capital in East Africa: Is There a Right Model? 451
453
 Conversation #14 
 Creating the PayPal Mafi a 
of East Africa 
 Ben Lyon of Kopo Kopo 
 Ben Lyon  co-founded Kopo Kopo in 2010 and sits currently on the Board of 
Directors. Earlier, he studied economics and international studies at Rhodes 
College in Memphis, Tennessee, where he specialized in informal economics 
and microﬁ nance. Ben has served in various roles while at Kopo Kopo, from 
Head of Product to VP of Marketing and CEO. He has operational experience 
in multiple markets throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Find Ben on 
Twitter @bmlyon, and check out his company at www.kopokopo.com. 
 What is the story behind Kopo Kopo? And why did you decide to 
start in Kenya? 
 We—Dylan, Tom, and I—co-founded Kopo Kopo fi ve years ago in 
Seattle, Washington, as a Delaware C corporation. Dylan and I moved to 
Nairobi in late 2010 and lived here for four years. 
 Th e reason we came here was because of the ubiquity of mobile money. 
Our background was all in microfi nance, and we had a hunch there was 
a business angle and a microfi nance angle in mobile money that hadn’t 
been fully exploited. Today that’s diff erent, because almost all microfi -
nance institutions (MFIs) in Kenya use mobile money for disbursement 
and collection to some degree. 
 In our early days, we wanted to help MFIs integrate mobile money 
with their core banking systems. We quickly found that this wasn’t the 
best idea—the reason being that microfi nance systems and processes aren’t 
standardized. MFIs can take ages to make a business decision, and they 
are highly bureaucratic and risk-averse, so they don’t change. Change is a 
frightening thing, so they are using lots of disparate legacy technologies, 
and there isn’t a real understanding or desire to fundamentally change 
that technology to catch up with the times. 
 Would you say that’s only typical for the MFI sector or for most SMEs 
in Kenya? 
 It’d be most SMEs. Fiber cables just came a few years ago, and so the 
Internet hasn’t fully reached all businesses yet, but you do see this massive 
growth in Android devices and 3G connections. MFIs are not at the front 
of the adoption curve. Th ey are not your early adopter. We found this 
quickly and pivoted to focus on retailers. By retailers, we mean a barber 
shop, a salon, a general trader, somewhere where you’re paying for goods 
and services to the person in front of you. 
 In early 2012, we launched as the world’s fi rst merchant aggregator of 
mobile money services. In essence, we were to Safaricom’s M-PESA what 
Square was to Chase Paymentech in the U.S. 
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 Safaricom is the issuer of M-PESA (Kiswahili for “mobile money”), 
the largest mobile money service in the world. When we entered the 
market, the majority of Kenyan adults had M-PESA on their phones, 
but less than one percent of businesses formally accepted it. So imagine 
if you were walking around with a payment card in your wallet but you 
couldn’t fi nd anywhere to pay with it. Th e utility of that card would 
be diminished signifi cantly. So we said to Safaricom, “Let us help you 
acquire merchants so people can pay for everyday goods and services with 
M-PESA.” We were the fi rst to do that in the mobile money industry, and 
we are currently the largest third party doing it. 
 Why did you decide to incorporate in the U.S. ? 
 We incorporated in the U.S. because we are Americans and planned 
to raise money from U.S. investors. For tech startups in the U.S., you 
either incorporate in your home state, in the state of your investor(s), or 
in Delaware as a C corporation. For a U.S. technology investor, that’s kind 
of the gold standard. So all lawyers in the U.S. are educated or taught on 
Delaware Case Law. C corporations can raise money from local and inter-
national investors. Th ey have good board protections etc. So because we 
were raising money in the U.S., we incorporated in Delaware and have a 
branch in Kenya rather than a subsidiary. All of our shares are domiciled in 
Delaware, and that’s again for investors. If we had a subsidiary, then we’d 
have shares sitting in Kenya, and that can complicate things in an exit. 
 Th e company was designed to be enticing and relatable to the investor 
and also kind of designed from the beginning as a technology company to 
be prepared in the event of an exit. So if someone wanted to acquire us, if we 
wanted to list on a stock exchange, that’s how investors get their money back. 
If you want to get investment, you have to be prepared. It’s not just what’s the 
product, what’s the opportunity, what’s the problem you solve, or how big is 
it? It’s also, how will I get my money back, and how long will it take, because 
they are not charitable organizations. So if they invest in you, on year three 
of their funds, they have seven years to get their money back. And so they are 
thinking in terms of an exit timeline from the very moment you shake hands. 
So you need to have a structure that accommodates that. 
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 How about your employees? How do you engage them? 
 Building Kopo Kopo is a mission, not a job. And by mission, I mean 
a higher calling—something both important and meaningful that is 
greater than our individual selves. We wanted a compensation package 
that refl ects that, and we wanted everyone to be aligned toward the same 
outcome. Every employee has a stake in the company’s future— engineers, 
sales personnel, drivers, janitors,  everyone . 
 Th e way it works is that every new employee signs an Employee Stock 
Option Agreement that entitles them to purchase shares at a strike price 
in the event of an acquisition or IPO. We also pay competitive salaries, so 
there aren’t any real trade-off s. It’s the best of both worlds. 
 Some time back I heard you talk about the “PayPal Maﬁ a of East 
Africa.” What makes it so valuable? 
 Silicon Valley is both ecosystem and mindset. Th e ecosystem is a func-
tion of mature capital markets, supportive institutions, and experienced 
entrepreneurs. It’s common to see successful entrepreneurs in Silicon 
Valley become investors, and for good reason: Th ey off er capital and, 
more importantly, empathy and expertise. Look for example at all of the 
consumer Internet companies you know today, the big ones, Facebook, 
Twitter, Foursquare, etc. Most of them have PayPal employees invested 
in them. So when PayPal IPOed, it made a huge number of millionaires, 
and now those employees are seeding entire generations of investment 
and starting new companies. You see it in 500 Startups, too. I mean, it’s 
all over the place—Peter Th iel with Palantir, Elon Musk with SpaceX and 
Tesla. Th ese are all PayPal people. We want to see that same ecosystem 
develop in East Africa. 
 Specifi cally, we talk about building the “PayPal Mafi a of East Africa” 
because we want our team to become the fi rst batch of entrepreneur- 
investors in the region. Th eir experience building a company and with-
standing the ebbs and fl ows of entrepreneurship are a real and lasting asset. 
 What’s happened here so far is that diff erent parts of the ecosystem are 
developing parallel to one another. You have the incubators like iHub, 
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Nailab, iLab Africa, m:lab East Africa, and all the accelerators. You have 
angel investors starting to come from other markets. And this is all 
 happening at the same time. What hasn’t happened yet is there haven’t 
been many successful exits from the technology community because it’s 
so young. And because of that, you don’t have many fi rst-generation 
tech entrepreneurs that are wealthy enough to invest in the next genera-
tion. So we need a big exit, and then we need the members of that com-
munity to become the PayPal Mafi a. Th at’s the missing element. 
 Five years from now, I’d love to see our earliest employees behind the 
biggest startups on the continent. Th at’s my personal vision of success. 
 How essential are investors from Africa to realize that vision? 
 I don’t think it’s about creating African investors or Silicon Valley 
investors or European investors. I think it’s about learning a skill and 
paying that skill forward irrespective of region or nationality. We built a 
company from the ground up in Nairobi. Th at’s what we know. As we’ve 
grown, we’ve seeded partnerships and cut our teeth throughout the con-
tinent. So I’m not on a mission to create “African investors”—I’m on a 
mission to create entrepreneur-investors that know their markets better 
than anyone else. 
 Should ICT ventures aim at becoming strategically valuable for a for-
eign buyout, reach for an international IPO, or simply not worry 
about it because other things matter? What is your strategy? 
 Th ere’s a saying that “companies are bought, not sold.” I think that’s 
true. Our main priority has been to build a big, defensible company. 
With defensible I mean that we’re in the business of digging moats to 
protect our castle from attack. A company that is not defensible cannot 
withstand attack, or direct competition. In other words, to be defensible 
means that you have to capture a market segment quickly, patent some 
kind of unique IP, or jump over a material barrier to entry. Defensible 
companies are hard to replicate or attack. 
 We’ve made mistakes along the way in terms of prioritizing incorrectly. 
For example, we scaled prematurely. Specifi cally, we hired for the business 
Conversation #14: Ben Lyon of Kopo Kopo 457
that our projections said we would have, not the business that our cash 
position dictated we actually had. We spent too much too quickly, and 
then we missed our targets. Another example is that we should have hired 
a chief fi nancial offi  cer or head of fi nance as early as 2013 or 2014 but 
only fi lled this role in late 2015. 
 In retrospect, I think we would have been more successful in 
the capital markets, if we had someone strong in the finance role. 
Despite these setbacks, our strategic goal has always been to build a 
big, defensible company. If you do that correctly, then there’s a ready 
exit path. 
 How have you managed the tension between openness versus 
closed-ness when it comes to broadcasting information about your 
company? 
 We’ve probably been  too open, insofar as we’ve always broadcasted our 
work. We’ve blogged about our work on the Kopo Kopo blog. We’ve also 
shared insights through industry blogs (e.g. CGAP, GSMA, and FSD 
Kenya). We’ve also talked about many of our insights and fi ndings at 
industry conferences around the world. On the one hand, we’ve had a 
number of competitors try to replicate our ideas. On the other, the global 
industry knows and looks to our work. So it’s hard to tell if our openness 
has been an asset or a liability. In general, though, it’s who we are—it’s in 
the DNA of our company. 
 What are some of the not-so-obvious risks you can get into when run-
ning a business in Kenya? 
 Risk is a relative term. It’s important to understand the day-to-day 
context of your customers, employees, and partners. Growing up in 
the U.S., my idea of risk was relatively limited, and I mean this in 
the literal sense. We lost a friend in the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, 
and one of our board members was murdered in Nairobi in 2014. My 
wife and I also repelled or escaped repeated home-invasion attempts 
and a carjacking in 2014. As a result, I now think about security every 
single day. Growing up in the U.S., I never had to be so conscious of 
458 B. Lyon
 physical security. We often talk about the relationship between risks 
and rewards. To be clear, there are real and signifi cant risks to operat-
ing a business in an emerging market. Th ings don’t often go south, but 
when they do, they go south quickly! Th at’s a realization that inspires 
humility and patience. 
 Th ank you, Ben! 
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